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THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND CORPORATE 
LIABILITY: REBUTTING THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL PRESUMPTION POST-
KIOBEL 
Maxwell R. Jones 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 11, 2001, the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia 
(AUC), a right wing paramilitary group, went on a killing spree 
throughout the Naya region in western Columbia, using guns, 
machetes, and chainsaws to kill thirty-two people.1 Evidence of such 
brutal violence, coupled with funding from regional drug cartels, led 
the U.S. State Department to classify the AUC as a terrorist 
organization in 2005.2 However, drug money was not the AUC’s 
only source of revenue. In 2007, Chiquita Brands International, best 
known for their bananas, admitted to paying out nearly $2 million 
directly to the AUC in areas near Chiquita owned banana plantations 
where the AUC exercised control.3 As a result, Chiquita paid fines 
totaling $25 million dollars and served five years of corporate 
probation because of payment to the AUC.4 When Columbian 
citizens sought damages from Chiquita in 2012, related to AUC 
violence in the early 2000s, they sought damages in the Southern 
District of Florida under a statute dating back to 1789: the Alien Tort 
Statute.5 
                                                                                                                 
  J.D. Candidate, Georgia State University College of Law, 2016; B.A. Sewanee: The University 
of the South, 2012. Many thanks to the editors of the Georgia State Law Review for their help and 
support this year. Thanks to Marshall and Pharan Evans for helpful comments and support. Finally, 
thanks to my parents, Cliff and Victoria Jones, and my sister McKenzie for their love and support. 
 1. THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TERRORISM 610 (C. Gus Martin ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 2. Nat’l Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Terrorist Organization 
Profile: United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC), START.UMD.EDU, http://www.start.umd.edu/ 
tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=126 (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 3. Kevin Bohn, Chiquita: $25M Fine for Terror Payments, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/09/11/chiquita.terrorism (last updated Sept. 11, 2007, 11:21 
PM). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1187 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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This Note focuses on corporate liability for companies with U.S. 
citizenship under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Part I discusses the 
history of the ATS through its revitalization in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala6 in 1980.7 Part II discusses the rise of litigation under the ATS 
from 1980 until the reach of the ATS was restricted by the United 
States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain8 and Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum9 in 2013.10 Part III outlines how circuit 
courts have dealt with corporate liability under the ATS since 2013’s 
Kiobel decision.11 Part IV offers a proposal for interpreting the 
language of Kiobel and offers a concise set of factors for district 
courts to use in determining when to properly exercise jurisdiction 
over a claim brought by aliens against U.S. corporations for 
allegations of torts committed abroad.12 
I.   BACKGROUND 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 enacted the ATS to prevent a U.S. 
citizen’s tort from implicating the U.S. as a sovereign nation in an 
international conflict.13 In the late eighteenth century, a country that 
failed to redress a citizen’s tort was held responsible for the citizen’s 
tort.14 The ATS provides in its entirety, “The district courts shall 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 7. See discussion infra Part I. The ATS stood “largely dormant” for almost two centuries after its 
enactment in 1789. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 
7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Only two district courts invoked jurisdiction during that two-century period. See 
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) 
(No. 1607). 
 8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004). 
 9. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). For a general discussion of the 
history of the ATS through the Supreme Court’s seminal decisions in Sosa and Kiobel see Michael D. 
Ramsey, Returning the Alien Tort Statute to Obscurity, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 67 (2013); see also 
Kedar S. Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute, 27 
EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 447, 469–77 (2013). 
 10. See discussion infra Part II. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III. For a critical analysis on the first Kiobel opinion out of the Second 
Circuit—before the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling on Kiobel (Kiobel II)—see Matthew E. Danforth, 
Note, Corporate Civil Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: Exploring its Possibility and Jurisdictional 
Limitations, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 659 (2011). 
 12. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 13. Bhatia, supra note 9, at 453–54. 
 14. Id.; see also Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. 
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have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”15 Although the Statute is only thirty-five words, much 
judicial and academic ink has come from its interpretation.16 The 
ATS was largely dormant from its enactment in 1789 until Filartiga 
v. Pena-Irala in 1980.17 Filartiga involved a suit in the Eastern 
District of New York between aliens for events that took place 
entirely in Paraguay.18 The grant of jurisdiction to hear the case in 
Filartiga paved the way for the ATS as a vehicle for aliens to bring 
lawsuits in U.S. district courts. Typically, these suits alleged human 
rights violations in the developing world, which violated the “law of 
nations.”19 
                                                                                                                 
REV. 830, 847–48 (2006). Professor Lee details how the ATS was enacted to provide redress for 
common law torts committed by private actors—including aliens—with a United States sovereign 
nexus. Id. at 830. Professor Lee draws on provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the 1790 Crimes Acts, 
Article III of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, to reason that 
the ATS was enacted to allow aliens to sue in federal district court to prevent the U.S. from potentially 
getting dragged into conflicts with other countries whose citizens are the victims of a U.S. citizen’s 
torts. Id. The importance of finding the statutory meaning at the time of enactment becomes important in 
light of the Supreme Court’s first ruling on the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, where the Court 
looked to the intent of the framers and the statutory meaning at the time of enactment to determine 
whether a claim is valid under the ATS. Id. at 833. 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For a discussion on the history surrounding the enactment of the ATS 
see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011). The ATS was enacted in part in response to the state’s failure to uphold the 
rights of British creditors under the Paris Peace Treaty 1783 and the state’s failure to redress acts of 
violence by citizens against British subjects. Id. at 466. On a larger scale, the ATS was designed to 
avoid U.S. responsibility for its citizens’ law of nations violations. Id. at 469–70. 
 16. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub., 726 F.2d 774, 812–16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002); 
Ann-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 461 (1989); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to 
the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996); Robert C. Thompson et al., 
Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International 
Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 841 (2009). 
 17. Only two suits involved the ATS in the nearly two-century span between 1789 and 1989. See 
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) 
(No. 1607). 
 18. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). The suit in Filartiga involved one 
Paraguay national bringing an action against another, while both were in the U.S., alleging that the 
defendant, the former Inspector General of police in Paraguay, tortured and killed the son of the plaintiff 
in Paraguay because of the plaintiff’s political affiliation. Id. Reversing the decision of the district court, 
the Second Circuit held the Plaintiff’s claim for arbitrary detention did constitute a tort in violation of 
the laws of nations within the meaning of the statute. Id.at 884. 
 19. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (a class action on 
behalf of Nigerians alleging Shell aided and abetted the Nigerian government in violating the law of 
3
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Although litigation under the ATS began in the 1980s, the U.S. 
Supreme Court did not hear an ATS case until Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain in 2004.20 Sosa involved a Mexican national’s suit against 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials and a Mexican 
national who aided the DEA in bringing the plaintiff to Texas, 
against his will, for a criminal trial.21 In Sosa, the Court clarified that 
the ATS was not only a jurisdictional statute, but also provided a 
cause of action based on violations of international norms that are 
“specific, universal, and obligatory.”22 The Court also instructed 
lower courts to account for practical considerations when exercising 
jurisdiction over international claims because of the potential for 
disputes with other nations and conflicts of law, considerations often 
                                                                                                                 
nations by suppressing opposition to oil exploration and drilling in the Ogoni Niger River Delta); Doe v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs were fifteen Indonesian villagers 
complaining that Defendant Exxon’s security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, 
and false imprisonment in violation of the ATS in the U.S. and Indonesia), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 
(D.C. Cir. 2013); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 256, 261 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (Sudanese nationals complaining that Defendant aided and abetted the Sudanese government 
in committing genocide by financing arms and military operations to suppress a movement to 
nationalize oil production). 
 20. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004); see also Bhatia, supra note 9, at 469 
(explaining that although the statute existed for 215 years the Supreme Court did not address it until 
2004). The Supreme Court was forced to deal with the question of whether the ATS was a purely 
jurisdictional statute or actually a new cause of action. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697, 712. The Court held that 
the Statute was not only a jurisdictional statute, but also a new cause of action under the “law of 
nations.” Id. at 712. The majority reasoned that if the statute was purely jurisdictional, it would have 
been “stillborn” at birth, given the fact that there was otherwise no secondary statute authorizing a cause 
of action. Id. at 714. The majority recognized that actions that would violate the “law of nations” in 
1789 include piracy, actions against ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct. Id. at 715. The Court 
not only looked to the history of the law of nations, but also provided for potential new causes of action 
as long as courts “require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the eighteenth-century paradigms we have recognized.” Id. at 725. 
 21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698. The criminal suit brought by the DEA was eventually dismissed and Sosa 
brought charges against both the DEA and Alvarez, a Mexican national, under the ATS. Id. 
 22. Id. at 732. The Court explained that these specifically defined and widely accepted “international 
norms” must also involve practical considerations with “an element of judgment about the practical 
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id. at 732–33. Further, 
these causes of action must reflect the “historical paradigms” that were familiar at the time of the ATS’s 
enactment. Id. at 732. Historical paradigms included behavior that would violate the law of nations in 
1789: piracy, actions against ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct. Id. at 694. Causes of action 
that fit within historical paradigms was the first category for a cause of action under the ATS. Id. at 732. 
The second cause of action under the ATS involved the violation of current international law, requiring 
(1) heightened specificity in pleading and (2) widespread international acceptance. Id. at 732; see also 
Bhatia, supra note 9, at 471. 
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left to the other branches of government under the political question 
doctrine.23 Thus, in order to state a claim post-Sosa, a plaintiff must 
state a violation of an international norm that is “specific, universal, 
and obligatory,” and do so in a way that does not violate the political 
question doctrine.24 
In light of this fact-driven inquiry, lower courts struggled to 
determine what actions violated a “specific, universal, and 
obligatory” international norm, and comported with the practical 
considerations outlined in Sosa.25 Furthermore, the Court in Sosa 
failed to clarify the scope of corporate liability, if any, under the 
ATS.26 Following Sosa, the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits all 
held that corporations could be held liable under the ATS.27 
However, the Second and D.C. circuits held that corporations were 
not liable under the ATS because the “law of nations”28 is applicable 
only to states and men, not juridical persons such as corporations.29 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (“The potential [foreign policy] implications . . . of recognizing . . . causes 
[under the ATS] should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretions of the Legislative 
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”). 
 24. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing the modern political question 
doctrine). 
 25. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, addressed some of the 
practical concerns in a concurring opinion, noting that “[t]oday international law will sometimes 
similarly reflect not only substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior but also 
procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior.” Id. at 762 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
 26. Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to 
hold corporations liable under the ATS) aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), with Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (allowing corporate liability under the statute), vacated, 527 F. App’x 
7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 27. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Romero v. 
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”) (emphasis added). Under the “law of nations,” corporations are not held liable for human rights 
violations, as opposed to individuals or state actors. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 
111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate 
liability for international crimes, and no international tribunal has ever held a corporation liable for a 
violation of the law of nations.”), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). The Second Circuit based their holding 
on the international jurisprudence post-Nuremberg trials that held states and individual men as 
chargeable with human rights violations, but not juridical persons such as corporations. Id. at 119, 125–
32 (citing The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), opened for signature July 17, 
1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1016; The Nuremberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int’l 
Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1946); and 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 33, 119 (Sir Robert 
5
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In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed the ATS in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, but still did not address corporate 
liability under the statute.30 Kiobel involved a claim by Nigerian 
nationals against a Dutch corporation for events that took place in 
Africa.31 With the concern for potential conflicts of law in mind, the 
Court limited the reach of the ATS, holding that “[t]he presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS . . . .”32 In 
other words, the ATS presumably does not apply to events that take 
place outside of U.S. territory. Plaintiffs can overcome this 
presumption, however, when “claims touch and concern the territory 
of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”33 What constitutes 
“sufficient force” to rebut the extraterritorial presumption is still 
unclear.34 Concerning corporations, the Court stated, “[c]orporations 
are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say 
that [a] mere corporate presence suffices” to displace the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.35 Although the Court 
                                                                                                                 
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996)). 
 29. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 83; Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (holding a corporation was not liable 
because looking at the jurisprudence of international law, notably the trials at Nuremberg, “offenses 
against the law of nations (i.e., customary international law) for violations of human rights can be 
charged against States and against individual men and women but not against but not against juridical 
persons such as corporations”). Judge Leval concurred in judgment in Kiobel, but disagreed with the 
denial of corporate liability, reasoning that although corporations were not subjects under International 
law, they nonetheless had obligations, and were bound to them. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 179–80 (Leval, J., 
concurring). 
 30. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662, 1669 (2013). 
 31. Id. at 1662. More specifically, Kiobel involved a suit filed by several exiled Nigerians living in 
the U.S. in 2002 against Shell Oil and its various subsidiaries. Id. The complaint alleged various human 
rights violations in connection with Nigerian military forces who in the mid-1990s were responsible for 
violently suppressing the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, a popular movement seeking 
to prevent oil pollution in the region. Id. at 1662–63. For an overview of the conflict itself see Joshua P. 
Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT’L L. J. 261, 264–71 (1997). 
 32. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. The Court noted that this presumption “serves to protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international 
discord.” Id. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
 33. Id. at 1669. 
 34. See, e.g., Bhatia, supra note 9, at 477 (explaining how “Kiobel raised as many new questions as 
it answered”). 
 35. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that if the statute was meant to 
more liberally exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial action, then it is up to Congress to enact a statute 
that is more specific than the ATS. Id. Although the Court does not lay out specific factors that would 
6
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narrowed the ATS in Kiobel, it did not clarify what factors, in 
addition to corporate presence, constitute sufficient force to rebut the 
presumption against extraterritorial application and hear the case.36 
Since the Kiobel decision in April of 2013, circuit courts look to 
different factors to analyze what is sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality for corporations.37 Only three 
months after Kiobel, the Second Circuit held that where plaintiffs fail 
to allege that any relevant conduct takes place in the U.S., Kiobel 
categorically bars all claims under the ATS.38 If the conduct occurs 
abroad, foreign plaintiffs can never sufficiently overcome the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, even if the defendant is an 
American citizen or corporation.39 
The Eleventh Circuit further limited the ATS in July of 2014, 
holding that even when the defendant is a U.S. corporation, and part 
of the relevant conduct alleged by aliens took place in the U.S., 
                                                                                                                 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, Justice Alito alluded to a heightened standard, 
“[T]he presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated 
to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.” Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010)). Justice Alito further proposed 
that the defendant’s domestic conduct itself must violate an international law norm. Id. 
 36. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the Court in Kiobel left “significant 
questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute” unanswered, which “may 
require some further elaboration and explanation.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 37. Compare Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding 
plaintiffs did not state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture and murder in Colombia, but financed 
and overseen by a U.S. corporation), with Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–
31 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding plaintiffs did state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture in Iraq, but 
financed and overseen by a U.S. corporation). 
 38. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs in Balintulo argued 
that whether the relevant conduct occurred abroad is only one factor of a multi-factor test, and that the 
ATS reaches extraterritorial conduct when the actor is an American citizen, in this case a corporate 
citizen. Id. The Second Circuit disagreed, “The Supreme Court expressly held that claims under the ATS 
cannot be brought for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other 
than the United States.” Id.; see also Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 54 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs’ ATS claim against defendant corporation because all of the alleged 
conduct took place in Bangladesh). 
 39. For a discussion on viable alternatives in light of these ATS restrictions, see Roger P. Alford, 
Human Rights after Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY 
L.J. 1089 (2014). Given the jurisdictional hurdle under the ATS, some have offered alternatives to the 
statute under the theory of transnational tort litigation. Transnational tort litigation consists of pleading a 
human rights violation as a traditional domestic or foreign tort violation, where there is no presumption 
of extraterritoriality. Id. at 1095 n.13. In this context, courts apply tort laws based on traditional choice 
of law models, many of which are already in use in the context of international terrorism. Id. 
7
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jurisdiction under the ATS is still improper.40 In Cardona v. Chiquita 
Brands International, the Eleventh Circuit noted that because the 
complaint did not state that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality barred an ATS claim.41 
However, the plaintiffs in Cardona also alleged that Chiquita 
corporate officers oversaw and financed the alleged conduct from 
their corporate headquarters, in the U.S., for the purpose of carrying 
out the conduct abroad.42 In a lengthy dissent, Judge Beverly Martin 
noted that in stark contrast to Kiobel, the plaintiffs in Cardona were 
not seeking to hold the defendant vicariously liable for actions of its 
agents or subsidiaries, nor were the plaintiffs alleging tortious 
conduct that took place exclusively on foreign soil.43 Judge Martin 
reasoned that because of these two important factual distinctions, the 
claims here were properly stated under the ATS.44 In addressing 
Judge Martin’s dissent, the majority reasoned that because there were 
no allegations that torture occurred on U.S. territory, the claims were 
barred under Kiobel.45 
The Fourth Circuit took a more liberal view of jurisdiction in Al 
Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology.46 In Al Shimari, four Iraqi 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189. 
 41. Id. at 1189–90. 
 42. Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin further supports her reasoning with the 
legislative history of the ATS, namely the concern of the framers that the U.S. would “fail to meet the 
expectations of the international community were we to allow U.S. citizens to travel to foreign shores 
and commit violations of the law of nations with impunity.” Id. at 1193 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)). Judge Martin draws further on several 
historical references to support her statutory interpretation, citing Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss legal 
philosopher from the eighteenth century: “A sovereign who refuses to repair the evil done by one of his 
subjects, or to punish the criminal, or, finally to deliver him up, makes himself in a way an accessory to 
the deed and becomes responsible for it.” Id. at 1193 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting EMMERICH DE 
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND 
TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS bk. II, ch. VI § 77 (1758) (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 
1916) (emphasis added)). It is precisely this responsibility for the actions of a citizen that Judge Martin 
argues the founders were attempting to avoid, and exactly the same kind of conduct that was at issue in 
the case. Id. at 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 1191. The majority further states as dicta that although allowing U.S. citizens to travel 
abroad and violate international law with impunity may raise international diplomatic concerns, such 
concerns are vested in the purview of the executive and legislative branch, in managing foreign affairs 
and in legislating laws to deal with such concerns. Id. 
 46. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014). 
8
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citizens brought a claim for torture, in violation of international law, 
against a U.S. defense contractor stemming from the Abu Ghraib 
prison scandal.47 The defendants in Al Shimari made the exact same 
argument as the Eleventh Circuit majority in Cardona: the plaintiffs 
alleged only conduct that occurred outside of U.S. territory, so their 
claims should be dismissed under Kiobel.48 The Fourth Circuit 
disagreed, reasoning that a “more nuanced analysis” of all factors is 
required, rather than a bright-line rule.49 The Fourth Circuit found 
jurisdiction by broadly interpreting whether “the ‘relevant conduct’ 
alleged in the claims ‘touch[es] and concern[s] the territory of the 
United States with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption . . . .’”50 Unlike the relevant conduct in Kiobel, which 
only touched the U.S. with “mere corporate presence,” the plaintiffs 
here alleged substantial ties with the U.S., including the performance 
of a contract with the federal government.51 The Fourth Circuit 
explicitly rejected a bright-line rule that conduct, which occurs 
exclusively abroad, bars an ATS claim per se.52 The Fourth Circuit 
cited four important factors in rebutting the extraterritorial 
presumption: (1) the U.S. citizenship of the corporate defendant, (2) 
the U.S. citizenship of the corporation’s employees involved in the 
conduct, and (3) a contract between the defendant and the U.S. 
government.53 The Fourth Circuit’s approach to an ATS claim, and in 
accordance with Kiobel, is directly at odds with how the Eleventh 
Circuit interpreted a nearly identical fact pattern.54 Reconciling these 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 521. 
 48. Id. at 520. 
 49. Id. at 528. 
 50. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)). 
 51. Id. at 528. 
 52. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528. “[I]t is not sufficient merely to say that because the actual injuries 
were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch and concern United States territory.” Id. 
 53. Id. at 530. The Court disposed of the practical considerations regarding conflict of laws and 
foreign policy implications because the defendant was a corporate citizen of the U.S. Id. (citing Sexual 
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–24 (D. Mass. 2013)) (reasoning Kiobel does not 
bar claims against an American citizen, for practical reasons at least, because a foreign national is not 
dragged into U.S. courts). 
 54. Compare Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding 
plaintiffs did not state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture and murder in Colombia when 
injuries were financed and overseen by a U.S. corporation), with Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530–31 
(holding plaintiffs did state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture in Iraq when injuries were 
9
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approaches, and determining the most important factors that “rebut 
the presumption of extraterritoriality,” is vital for district courts 
ruling, plaintiffs seeking recovery, and general counsel for any 
company with an international reach. This Note offers such a 
proposal. 
II.   ANALYSIS 
The key question in determining corporate liability under the ATS 
is whether conduct that is a violation of the law of nations 
sufficiently touches and concerns the U.S. to rebut the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.55 Courts generally look to four factors to 
determine if conduct sufficiently touches and concerns the U.S. to 
rebut the extraterritorial presumption: (1) the nature and place of the 
conduct itself, (2) the citizenship of the corporate defendant, (3) the 
connection between the conduct and tort-feasor, and (4) the political 
question doctrine.56 Some courts view the nature and place of the acts 
themselves as the dispositive factor in exercising jurisdiction.57 
Others view all the factors together, comprising different prongs of a 
multi-factor test.58 Determining how these factors relate is the scope 
of this analysis.59 
A.   The Conduct Itself  
Undoubtedly, the conduct itself is the most important factor of 
analysis, and for some courts is alone determinative.60 Conduct 
sufficient to state a claim must (1) be a violation of the law of nations 
and (2) have a sufficient connection with the United States.61 The 
                                                                                                                 
financed and overseen by a U.S. corporation). 
 55. See supra notes 32–33. 
 56. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530–31. 
 57. See, e.g., Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189; Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 58. See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 533. 
 59. See discussion infra Part II.A–C. 
 60. See, e.g., Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 190 (holding that even if a defendant is a corporate citizen, “if all 
the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel”). 
 61. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 
(2013)). 
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second element, a sufficient U.S. connection, ultimately determines 
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is overcome.62 
1.   Relevant Conduct and Acts Must Violate the Laws of Nations 
Under the ATS, the acts themselves must be “in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”63 Traditionally, 
torture, genocide, mass rape, and extrajudicial killings are 
specifically defined norms of international character, which are 
sufficient to constitute a violation of the law of nations.64 
The primary issue regarding corporate liability under the law of 
nations is that not all actors are liable for the same acts.65 For 
example, international law holds state and individual actors liable for 
torture while corporations are exempt.66 The Supreme Court noted, 
however, that international law imposes only substantive 
obligations,67 including genocide, torture, and extrajudicial killings.68 
Individual nations decide how to enforce these substantive 
obligations under domestic theories of liability.69 Although Sosa 
suggests that international law governs who may be liable for 
substantive violations, discussing differences between states and 
people,70 customary international law only establishes norms of 
conduct, not the available remedies for violations of that conduct.71 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 529. 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 64. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 267 (2d Cir. 2007). To determine 
customary international law that is a violation of the laws of nations, courts look to law identified by the 
International Court of Justice and international conventions. Id. Any claim based upon the present day 
law of nations must rest on a norm of international character that is accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the feature of recognized eighteenth-century paradigms. Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
 65. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 66. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Although torture committed by a state is 
recognized as a violation of a settled international norm, that cannot be said of private actors.”). 
 67. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422–23 (1964). 
 68. See supra note 64. 
 69. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 422–23; see also Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber 
Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 70. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (“A related consideration [to 
determining whether there is a viable cause of action under the ATS] is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the 
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”). 
 71. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 
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The Supreme Court held that although international law provides no 
cause of action to sue corporations, common law does.72 The law of 
nations does not create a cause of action, but norms, that when 
violated, provide a cause of action under common law.73 
Accordingly, federal courts must determine corporate liability “for 
the tortious conduct of their agents by reference to federal common 
law governing tort remedies.”74 
2.   The Connection Between the Violations and the Corporate 
Defendant 
Corporations are traditionally liable under common law for the 
tortious conduct of their agents under respondeat superior.75 
Corporate liability through agency was an accepted principle of tort 
law by the time of the ATS’s enactment in 1789.76 The historical 
context of corporate liability through agency is vital given the 
Court’s requirement in Sosa that an ATS suit must harmonize with an 
international violation that carried liability at the time of the statute’s 
enactment.77 
Accordingly, plaintiffs typically sue for the actions of corporate 
subsidiaries, or individual employees, in ATS litigation under the 
agency theory of respondeat superior.78 Corporations can be liable 
                                                                                                                 
2013). “[T]he ATS provides federal jurisdiction where the conduct at issue fits a norm qualifying under 
Sosa implies that for purposes of affording a remedy, if any, the law of the United States and not the law 
of nations must provide the rule of decision in an ATS lawsuit.” Id. 
 72. Id. (“[T]he fact that the law of nations provides no private right of action to sue corporations 
addresses the wrong question and does not demonstrate that corporations are immune from liability 
under the ATS. There is no right to sue under the law of nations; no right to sue natural persons, 
juridical entities, or states.”). 
 73. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In interpreting a proper 
cause of action under the ATS, Judge Scheindlin stated, “By passing the ATS, Congress created an 
action in tort for violations of the law of nations.” Id. 
 74. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 
2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). 
 75. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 48, 54 (citing Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 
980 (K.B.); Chestnut Hill & Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6 (Pa. 1818)). 
 76. Id. at 47. 
 77. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). “Federal courts should not recognize 
private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite 
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the [historical] paradigms familiar when § 1350 
was enacted.” Id. at 694. 
 78. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (allowing claims against the U.S. 
12
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for the actions of their agents or subsidiaries if they have knowledge 
that their dealings facilitated a violation of the law of nations, even if 
the companies did not intend for their agents, or their actions, to have 
that effect.79 Further, corporations are liable for the actions of those 
who they have an exclusive relationship with, or who they exert 
economic advantage over, although such actors are not agents in the 
traditional sense.80 
a.   The Citizenship of the Corporate Defendant—Irrelevant in 
the Second and Eleventh Circuits 
In light of Kiobel, corporate presence, even if substantial, is not 
alone sufficient to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.81 Even in cases where the defendant corporation is 
a citizen of the U.S., and not merely present, courts have found U.S. 
citizenship insufficient to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.82 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit, in Cardona v. 
Chiquita Brands International, found that even where a defendant 
corporation is a U.S. citizen, if the plaintiff does not allege violations 
of international law occurred within the U.S., jurisdiction is 
improper.83 However, the Eleventh Circuit in Cardona heightened 
                                                                                                                 
for the actions of military personal under respondeat superior because the officers were acting within the 
scope of their employment, even though their conduct was criminal in nature and only incidentally 
authorized by the employer); In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(allowing a suit to proceed under agency theory of respondeat superior under which a corporation was 
held liable for the actions of its South African subsidiaries). 
 79. See, e.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 259–62 (holding that IBM, Ford, and 
Daimler could be liable for actions of South African subsidiaries based only on the knowledge that the 
sales of their goods to the South African government helped facilitate apartheid in South Africa, even if 
the Company did not intend in selling the goods to facilitate that effect). 
 80. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014). In Nestle, the Ninth 
Circuit held defendants may be liable for the acts of their unaffiliated cocoa farms on the Ivory Coast 
based on “exclusive buyer/seller relationships” and the defendants’ “economic leverage” over the farms 
based on the defendants’ sizeable market share. Id. at 1017. The defendants in Nestle also had 
knowledge about Slave labor that existed at these farms based on firsthand visits and reports issued by 
domestic and international organizations. Id. 
 81. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (“Corporations are often 
present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If 
Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.”). 
 82. See Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014); see also 
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 83. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1191. 
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the presumption against extraterritoriality further than the Supreme 
Court required in Kiobel.84 
The plaintiffs in Cardona alleged a violation of the law of nations 
that occurred on U.S. soil when Chiquita allegedly organized and 
financed the acts of torture from U.S. soil that eventually occurred in 
Columbia.85 The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome even though the 
defendant was a U.S. citizen and some of the alleged conduct 
occurred on U.S. soil.86 The most important factor for the Eleventh 
Circuit was that the torture itself occurred aboard, even though that 
torture was allegedly organized and financed from U.S. soil.87 The 
missing territorial connection between the wrongful conduct and the 
U.S. was the pivotal factor for the court.88 Judge Martin’s dissent in 
Cardona advocated for a broader reading of touch and concern, 
stating that claims sufficiently touch and concern the territory of the 
U.S. if the defendant aids and abets extraterritorial torts from the 
U.S., even if the torts themselves did not occur domestically.89 
The Eleventh Circuit further clarified Cardona’s heightened 
standard in Baloco v. Drummond.90 Similar to Cardona, Baloco 
involved a suit by aliens against a U.S. company.91 The important 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. (holding ATS does not apply even where a corporation is a U.S. citizen, reasoning that U.S. 
citizenship does not matter if the alleged conduct took place on foreign soil). 
 85. Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). In dissenting, Judge Martin importantly pointed out that 
unlike the plaintiffs in Kiobel, the complaint alleged that “Chiquita participated in a campaign of torture 
and murder in Columbia by reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons 
shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the 
United States.” Id. Further, these acts were not only carried out with the knowledge that torture was 
occurring, but for the purpose of furthering the torture. Id. at 1194. For these reasons, Judge Martin 
distinguished Cardona from Kiobel, and concluded the claims touched and concern the territory of the 
U.S. to exercise jurisdiction. Id. At 1195. 
 86. Id. at 1191. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Jaramillo v. Naranjo, No. 10-21951-CIV, 2014 WL 4898210, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2014) 
(discussing the importance of a territorial link between extraterritorial conduct and the U.S. in 
Cardona). 
 89. Cardona, 760 F.3d. at 1194–95 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin cites to numerous circuit 
and district court decisions. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 
(4th Cir. 2014); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-cv-05395, 2015 WL 1669873, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr. 
28, 2014); Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013); Sexual Minorities of Uganda v. Lively, 
960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323–24 (D. Mass. 2013). 
 90. Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 91. Id. at 1233. 
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distinction for the court in Baloco was that violations of the law of 
nations merely originated, but did not occur in the U.S., and thus 
were insufficient to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.92 The Eleventh Circuit drew guidance from the 
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank,93 which discussed the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
relation to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.94 The Supreme 
Court in Morrison stated that the foreign conduct inquiry turns on 
“where the transaction that is the focus of the statute at issue 
occurred.”95 The ATS, unlike the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934, does not focus on where a transaction occurs, but on what 
types of conduct occur, regardless of location.96 The Eleventh 
Circuit, using this reasoning, concluded that because the plaintiff’s 
claims “are not focused within the United States,” the violations 
touched and concerned the United States, but still lacked sufficient 
force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.97 
The Second Circuit, took a similarly restrictive, but more bright-
line approach to the issue: “if all the relevant conduct occurred 
aboard, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.”98 Thus, the 
importance of the extraterritorial inquiry for both the Second and 
Eleventh Circuits turns entirely on the connection between the 
relevant conduct and the U.S. territory, not the citizenship of the 
corporate defendant. In these jurisdictions, it seems likely that if an 
individual can allege that some relevant conduct took place in the 
U.S., which is a violation of the Laws of Nations on U.S. soil, only 
then is an ATS claim proper. 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 1237 (“The fact that deceptive conduct originated in the United States did not defeat the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”). 
 93. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010). 
 94. Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1236–37. 
 95. Id. at 1237. In Morrison, the focus of the statute was the place where the securities were 
purchased and sold. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267. The focus of a statute, according to the Court in 
Morrison, is the source of Congressional concern in enacting the statute. Id. 
 96. Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1237. 
 97. Id. at 1238. 
 98. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Chowdhury v. WorldTel 
Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (overturning a jury verdict under the ATS 
holding that because all relevant conduct occurred in Bangladesh, the plaintiff’s ATS claim should have 
been barred by the district court judge). 
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b.   The Fourth and Ninth Circuits Take a Different Approach 
Post-Kiobel 
Along with Judge Martin’s dissent in Cardona, the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits stand in sharp contrast to the Second and Eleventh 
Circuits interpretations of Kiobel. The Ninth Circuit, in Doe v. Nestle 
USA, reaffirmed “a norm-by-norm analysis of corporate liability” 
under the ATS.99 In Doe, the defendants allegedly visited the actual 
sites of child slavery on the Ivory Coast several times a year for 
training and quality control of their cocoa farms.100 Further, the 
defendants lobbied against congressional efforts to curb child 
slavery, although no child slavery actually took place in the United 
States.101 The defendants in Doe argued for the court to use the 
“focus” test in determining if conduct rebuts the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.102 This test was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in 
Baloco and explained by the Supreme Court in Morrison.103 The 
focus test involves an inquiry into the connection between the 
territorial events or relationships of the ATS and the United States.104 
This inquiry centers on what relevant conduct the statute seeks to 
forbid or regulate (the focus) and the physical location where that 
conduct took place (the connection).105 
The Ninth Circuit rejected the “focus” test for three reasons. First, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Court in Kiobel specifically used 
the language “touch and concern” rather than “focus,” two similar, 
but distinguishable, jurisdictional tests for extraterritorial conduct.106 
Second, Justice Alito and Kennedy both noted that the opinion in 
Kiobel left “much unanswered” in determining what sufficiently 
touched and concerned the U.S.107 Third, the court noted that the 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 100. Id. at 1017. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1028. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028. 
 107. Id. at 1027–28 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) 
(Alito, J., concurring); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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focus test relies on congressional intent and cannot be applied to ATS 
claims, which are claims based substantively on international norms 
rather than statute.108 The focus test in Morrison relies on a statutory 
claim based on a statutory cause of action.109 Although the court in 
Doe declined to define “touch and concern,” it held that when a part 
of the conduct underlying the claims occurred within the U.S., a 
viable claim is possible.110 
In Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, the Fourth Circuit 
found that torture allegations, although occurring exclusively in Iraq, 
sufficiently rebutted the presumption based on four key factors: (1) 
the defendant was a U.S. corporation, (2) the tort-feasors themselves 
were U.S. citizens, (3) the contract and planning for the entire 
business operation was executed in the U.S., and (4) oversight and 
approval of tortious conduct from U.S. soil.111 
The Second and Eleventh Circuit’s ATS standards under Balintulo 
and Cardona, respectively, destroy the ATS by requiring the same 
allegations that would make up a typical common law tort claim.112 
Under this standard, tortious acts themselves must occur against 
foreign nationals, on U.S. soil. This heightened standard would 
render the ATS redundant in light of common law tort remedies.113 A 
foreign national could simply bring a cause of action for common 
law torts through diversity jurisdiction, without needing the ATS at 
all.114 Most importantly, such a reading of the ATS in light of Kiobel 
effectively disarms the statute as a viable cause of action, and 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Id. at 1028. 
 109. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267. 
 110. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028 (“Moreover, it would be imprudent to attempt to apply and refine the 
touch and concern test where the pleadings before us make no attempt to explain what portion of the 
conduct underlying the plaintiffs[‘] claims took place within the United States.”) (emphasis added). 
 111. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 112. See, e.g., Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. 149 (1704) (the seminal case establishing common law assault 
and battery); see also Wallace v. Rosen, 765 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (outlining intent 
element of battery). 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 114. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). An alien may easily bring a suit under diversity jurisdiction against a 
U.S. corporation as longs as the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000. Id. Further, “[a]ll fifty 
states have some form of statutory action for the recovery of the wrongful death of another.” VICTOR E. 
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 591 (Robert C. 
Clark et al. eds., 12th ed. 2010) 
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destroys its statutory purpose in providing a venue for foreign 
nationals to bring suits against U.S. citizens for torts committed 
abroad.115 
B.   Practical Considerations: The Wild-Card Factor 
ATS suits create particular “risks of adverse foreign policy 
consequences” requiring courts to exercise caution in “impinging on 
the discretion of the [l]egislative and [e]xecutive [b]ranches in 
managing foreign affairs.”116 These considerations require a district 
court to look to policy implications, not only precedential guidance, 
in hearing a claim under the ATS.117 Specifically, there is concern 
about the policy consequences of making a certain cause of action 
generally available to all potential plaintiffs.118 Courts have not 
specifically enumerated what kinds of practical considerations are 
most important, but such policy decisions more aptly fall within the 
individual judgment of the district courts.119 The general goal, 
however, is to avoid “unintended clashes between our laws and those 
of other nations which could result in international discord.”120 In 
avoiding these unintended clashes, the Supreme Court suggested 
looking to the legislature for guidance before expansion of the 
ATS.121 
 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 
1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating ATS is in part designed to prevent the “United States from 
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy 
of mankind” (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004))). 
 116. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28. 
 117. Id. at 732–33. The Court explicitly stated in Sosa that determining if an international norm is 
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action must involve practical judgment about the 
“consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id. (quoting Hilao v. 
Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 118. Id. at 732–33. 
 119. Id. 
 120.  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad 
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22 (1963)). 
 121. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726. 
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C.   Reconciliation and the Road Forward 
 
The key to a proper suit by an alien against a U.S. corporation 
under the ATS should require three factors: (1) U.S. corporate 
citizenship, (2) tortious conduct controlled or directly financed from 
U.S. soil, and (3) tortious conduct that is a clear violation of 
international law pursuant to the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).122 These three factors accomplish several goals, and follow 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel.123 First, U.S. citizenship 
ensures that clashes between conflicts of laws do not occur under the 
foreign policy concerns enumerated by the Court in Sosa.124 Second, 
evidence of financing or oversight from the U.S. connects the 
conduct to U.S. territory far greater than “mere corporate presence” 
found by a company’s incidental domestic business.125 Additionally, 
direct financing and oversight fits soundly within agency theory, or 
aiding and abetting, which establishes corporate liability under 
common law agency.126 Finally, utilizing the enumerated violations 
of international law from the ICC is a simple and objective way to 
determine when a substantive violation of the “law of nations” 
occurs.127 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014); Al Shimari v. CACI 
Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 123. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). The 
minority’s concurrence asserted that if the “defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affect[ed] 
an important American national interest” jurisdiction is proper. Id. This factor by the minority treads 
dangerously close to judicial activism the Court warned of in Sosa. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726. 
 124.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28. In Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the defendant 
companies were U.S. citizens, “[t]his case does not present any potential problems associated with 
bringing foreign nationals into United States courts to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that 
the defendants are United States citizens.” Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530 (citing Sexual Minorities Uganda 
v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–24 (D. Mass. 2013)). 
 125. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1192, 1194 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., 
dissenting) (allegations that tortious conduct was approved “from their offices in the United States” was 
sufficient to state a claim that connected the U.S. territory to extraterritorial conduct). 
 126. See Nestle, 654 F.3d at 57. 
 127. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
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III.   PROPOSAL 
Courts seek to interpret statutes so every clause and word of a 
statute, if possible, is given effect.128 To require allegations of 
tortious conduct occur on U.S. soil, as the Second and Eleventh 
Circuits do, reads the ATS in a way that gives no effect to the 
Statute.129 This reading makes the ATS redundant with common law, 
which already provides aliens a tort cause of action for typical 
international law violations in federal courts through diversity 
jurisdiction.130 International law violations such as torture, 
extrajudicial killing, and other law of nations violations, if actually 
committed on U.S. soil, are clear common law tort claims with no 
need to invoke the ATS.131 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel 
noted that an important function of the ATS is to prevent the U.S. 
from becoming a “safe harbor” from a common enemy of 
humankind.132 Under the heightened territorial nexus required by the 
Second and Eleventh Circuits, the judicial branch has essentially 
overturned the ATS by requiring plaintiffs to show a heightened 
territorial connection.133 As the Supreme Court recognized in Sosa, 
the ATS gives aliens a remedy for torts committed abroad by a U.S. 
national.134 
One of the earliest examples of an incident the ATS was designed 
to cover was a 1794 incident involving several American citizens 
who “joined in a French attack on the British colony of Sierra Leone, 
in violation of the United States’ official position of neutrality with 
respect to France and Britain.”135 In response to the incident, 
                                                                                                                 
 128. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 
U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). 
 129. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 130. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 131. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 69 (arguing that “because federal diversity jurisdiction has no 
territorial limit, aliens can sue U.S. citizens in federal court for foreign conduct (including conduct 
which violates international law) as long as they meet diversity jurisdiction’s amount-in-controversy 
requirement”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)). 
 132. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 133. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 596 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 U.S. 
Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795)). 
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Attorney General William Bradford stated, “‘there can be no doubt 
that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts 
of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United 
States,’ pursuant to the ATS.”136 In addressing this opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that General Bradford’s opinion was “too slender a 
reed” to support an ATS claim based only on citizenship.137 Although 
the Supreme Court found the Bradford opinion to defy a clear 
reading and alone failed to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, they hinted at oral argument, that the case would 
be different if the defendant corporation Shell was a U.S. citizen, 
rather than Dutch citizen.138 
Some scholars argue in light of Kiobel, and the circuit court 
decisions discussed supra, that the ATS is functionally dead.139 They 
argue that alien plaintiffs should bring suit under a theory of 
“transnational tort litigation,” rather than the ATS, because there is 
no presumption against extraterritoriality.140 In that context, courts 
apply state or foreign tort laws based on traditional choice-of-law 
principles.141 Although transnational tort litigation may serve as a 
viable alternative for plaintiffs, it ignores the bigger issue—the 
destruction of a statutory cause of action by the judicial branch.142 
Even worse, the judicial branch has not destroyed a statutory scheme 
that is an antiquated relic of the eighteenth century, but part of a 
larger statutory scheme that was expanded in 1991 as the Torture 
Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which aimed to prevent human rights 
abuses abroad by giving plaintiffs access to U.S. courts.143 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013). 
 139. See discussion supra Part II; see also Alford, supra note 39, at 1099. 
 140. Alford, supra note 39, at 1091. Professor Alford urges plaintiffs to reframe human rights 
violations, previously brought under the ATS, as transnational torts because common law tort claims 
have no extraterritorial presumption. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2) (2014). The TVPA is a statute enacted in March of 1992 that gives a 
civil cause of action in the United States against individuals who commit torture or extrajudicial killings 
while acting “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.” Id. Plaintiffs 
often state a cause of action under the TVPA in addition to an ATS claim. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle 
USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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In order to salvage the ATS, while recognizing the sensitive nature 
of foreign policy concerns in ATS cases, district courts should look 
to three factors in determining a viable cause of action under the 
ATS.144 First, the violation, or primary conduct, must have been 
overseen or financed in part from the U.S.145 Second, the defendant 
must be a U.S. citizen.146 Third, the relevant extraterritorial conduct 
must be a clear violation of the ICC’s Rome Statute.147 
A.   The Violation of International Law is Overseen or Financed in 
Part from the U.S. 
District courts should require plaintiffs to allege that a U.S. 
corporation either (1) aided and abetted, or (2) conspired to commit a 
violation of the Laws of Nations while on or from U.S. territory in 
order to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.148 Aiding 
and abetting violations of the Laws of Nations is recognized, even in 
circuits least receptive to ATS litigation, as an accepted theory of 
corporate liability.149 
When a U.S. corporation actually aids and abets, or is involved in 
a conspiracy to commit a violation of the law of nations, courts 
should be less concerned about potential foreign policy implications 
of projecting U.S. law onto conduct in a foreign country. Foreign 
policy implications are a concern for district courts because of the 
dangers of imposing U.S. law onto the actions of a foreign 
jurisdiction.150 These dangers include conflicts of laws and 
diplomatic concerns typically reserved for the executive.151 This 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See discussion supra Part II.E. 
 145. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 146. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 147. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 148. Int’l Crim. Ct. (ICC), Rome Statute, pt. 3, art. 25, § 3(c), ICC, Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July, 17, 
1998), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/ 
RomeStatutEng1.pdf. 
 149. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 150. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013). “[A]pplying U.S. law to 
pirates does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within 
the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy 
consequences.” Id. 
 151. Id. at 1669. 
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foreign policy concern was one of the primary concerns for the 
Supreme Court in Kiobel.152 Holding companies liable for aiding and 
abetting, or a conspiracy that occurs on U.S. soil, alleviates this 
concern because these suits do not impose U.S. law on foreign 
conduct in a foreign jurisdiction.153 Rather, holding U.S. corporations 
accountable for the actions of planning, financing, and oversight that 
takes place in the U.S. means that U.S. law reaches only as far as the 
corners of the U.S. corporate office.154 Although the international 
violations themselves took place on foreign soil, the corporations are 
liable for aiding and abetting those actions, or conspiring to commit 
those acts directly on U.S. soil, not for the acts themselves.155 
Even courts that have used the “focus” test, rather than the “touch 
and concern” fact-based test, are satisfied under this territorial 
connection.156 The focus of the conduct under the ATS is a violation 
of the law of nations.157 The actual violation is the focus of that law, 
and under the focus test, that violation must have a sufficient physical 
nexus to the U.S.158 According to the ICC and pursuant to the Rome 
Statute, it is a violation of international law if an individual aids, 
abets or otherwise assists “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime . . . including providing the means for its 
commission.”159 
This conduct reflects the importance of direct financing originating 
in the U.S. to the commission of the relevant conduct, a decisive 
factor for the Fourth Circuit in rebutting the presumption against 
                                                                                                                 
 152. Id. at 1664. 
 153. Grant Dawson & Rachel Boynton, Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting 
Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 241, 
250 (2008) (reasoning that the offense of aiding and abetting in the scope of liability is different in 
liability as a direct perpetrator in that “one can be held liable for aiding and abetting genocide, even if 
one does not share the specific genocidal intent of the principal perpetrator”). 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 158. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (applying the focus test in the context of the Securities 
Exchange Act). 
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extraterritoriality in Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology.160 In 
Al-Shimari, the Fourth Circuit drew an important distinction in the 
contractual relationship executed in the United States for the 
execution of the relevant conduct abroad.161 The execution of the 
contract for security services in Al-Shimari was decisive in rebutting 
the presumption because it directly provided financing, even if not 
showing a purpose or intent to commit international violations.162 
Similarly, conduct of aiding and abetting, or conspiring, that directly 
finances or aids the commission of those violations serves the very 
same purpose as a contract.163 It directly gives resources to the 
commission of those international violations, even though one step 
removed from the relevant conduct itself.164 
B.   The Defendant Must be a U.S. Citizen 
The ATS aims to prevent the U.S. from becoming a “safe harbor” 
for a common enemy of humankind by requiring that a corporate 
defendant be a U.S. citizen.165 The potential for adjudication in 
alternative forums for foreign corporate defendants and availability 
of extradition of foreign natural persons also helps alleviate the “safe 
harbor” concern.166 
In requiring a defendant to hold U.S. citizenship, district courts can 
avoid implicating the political question doctrine and other foreign 
policy concerns surrounding an ATS claim.167 U.S. citizens, whether 
corporate or personal, implicitly accept the rules and laws of the 
jurisdiction where they reside.168 Unlike a corporation merely traded 
                                                                                                                 
 160. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. United States v. Hodorowicz, 105 F.2d 218, 220 (7th Cir. 1939) (“[A]ny one who assists in the 
commission of a crime may be charged directly with the commission of the crime.” (emphasis added)). 
 164. See id. 
 165. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 166. Id. Justice Breyer suggested that principles such as “exhaustion, forum non conveniens, and 
comity” were potential safeguards to unnecessary ATS litigation or other concerns about the correct 
forum. Id. 
 167. See supra notes 23–24. 
 168. See Yates v. Bridge Trading Co., 844 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the doctrine 
of internal affairs “provides that the law of the state of incorporation should be applied to settle disputes 
affecting the . . . structure or . . . administration of a corporation”). 
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on a U.S. stock exchange or doing business in the U.S., a corporate 
citizen of the U.S. accepts U.S. law and jurisdiction by voluntarily 
choosing to live or incorporate domestically.169 
A primary concern for the Supreme Court in Kiobel was the 
availability of alternative forums that were fair and ripe for 
adjudication:170 the Netherlands, where the corporate defendant Shell 
was domiciled, and Nigeria, where the relevant conduct took place.171 
When a corporation is a U.S. citizen, concerns regarding the 
sufficiency of an alternative forum or forum non conveniens are less 
likely in play.172 
Therefore, if a defendant is actually a U.S. citizen two important 
concerns are addressed. First, foreign policy concerns from bringing 
a foreign company into U.S. court for foreign actions are minimized 
because a U.S. company has accepted the governing laws and 
principles of the U.S. based upon their choice to be domiciled 
domestically.173 Second, forum selection concerns, such as forum non 
conveniens, are reduced.174 
C.   Clear International Violation Based on the International 
Criminal Court’s Rome Statute 
The ATS requires relevant conduct that is “committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”175 This element 
clearly identifies what relevant extraterritorial conduct is necessary to 
state a valid claim under the ATS.176 Courts have traditionally held 
that crimes such as torture, extrajudicial killing, and slavery were 
sufficient violations of international norms, but have not agreed on a 
unifying standard or body of law to look to in making this 
                                                                                                                 
 169. See id. 
 170. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 173. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (illustrating 
how the Fourth Circuit narrowed the four factors from Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. down to the 
two factors from Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Brown Services to arrive at the conclusion that although 
the injury occurred abroad, it did not violate the ATS). 
 174. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
 175. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 176. See id. 
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determination.177 The ICC is the first and only treaty based 
international court that addresses the most serious violations of 
international law.178 
The ICC is governed by the Rome Statute, which enumerates 
international violations and their requisite elements.179 Given the 
wide international support for the ICC, the Rome Statute provides a 
clear choice for district courts to determine whether the 
extraterritorial conduct itself is a sufficient violation of the Laws of 
Nations.180 Furthermore, circuit courts already rely on the ICC and 
the Rome Statute, although not solely on it.181 Utilizing the Rome 
Statute rather than a wide-ranging historical analysis gives district 
courts a predictable, bright-line rule for determining if the relevant 
extraterritorial conduct is actually a violation of the law of nations. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1980, the Alien Tort Statute underwent a remarkable rebirth in 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.182 However, in 2013, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum limited its jurisdictional reach.183 The Court attempted to 
limit the use of the ATS to extraterritorial conduct by applying the 
presumption against extraterritorial conduct to the statute.184 This 
presumption, however, has raised many questions about what U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 177. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1980); see also supra note 64, at 267. 
“The Supreme Court has enumerated the appropriate sources of international law. The law of nations 
‘may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the 
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’” 
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. 
 178. About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT. (ICC), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20 
court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2016). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 275–76 (2d Cir. 2007). The 
Second Circuit stated that the Rome Statute is a particularly useful tool in discerning international law 
because it is currently signed by 139 countries and ratified by 105, “including most of the mature 
democracies in the world . . . [i]t may therefore be taken by and large . . . as constituting an authoritative 
expression of the legal views of a great number of States.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 182. See discussion supra Part II. 
 183. See discussion supra Part II. 
 184. See discussion supra Part II. 
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contacts are sufficient to exercise jurisdiction.185 In light of current 
ATS litigation, it is important to balance judicial caution with hearing 
ATS claims that have an attenuated U.S. link with equal concern for 
destroying a statutory cause of action.186 District courts can safely 
balance these competing concerns by requiring a showing of (1) 
allegations of aiding and abetting through financing from the U.S., 
(2) U.S. citizenship of the defendant, and (3) a clear violation of the 


























                                                                                                                 
 185. See discussion supra Part III. 
 186. See discussion supra Part III. 
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